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RESUMO: Os advogados internacionais habitualmente 
presumiram que a distinção entre as regras primárias e secundárias 
no direito de responsabilidade do Estado é necessária. Este artigo 
investiga as origens da distinção desde o início dos trabalhos da 
Comissão de Direito Internacional sobre o tema até sua adoção 
formal pelo então Relator Especial Roberto Ago e, posteriormente, 
pela própria Comissão. A adoção da distinção é um resultado claro 
da vontade de extirpar as considerações políticas de um projeto de 
codificação das normas jurídicas internacionais, bem como de 
corroborar uma divisão entre forma e substância no âmbito da 
responsabilidade do Estado. Uma historiografia da distinção é 
necessária a fim de fornecer elementos para futuras reflexões sobre 
a codificação do direito internacional e para afirmar que uma 
concepção das regras de responsabilidade do Estado como 
secundárias depende do tempo. 
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ABSTRACT: International lawyers have usually assumed that the 
distinction between primary and secondary rules in the law of state 
responsibility is a necessary one. This article investigates the 
origins of the distinction since the beginnings of the International 
Law Commission's work on the topic until its formal adoption by the 
then Special Rapporteur Roberto Ago and, lately, by the 
Commission itself. The adoption of the distinction is a clear result 
of the wish to extirpate political considerations from a project of 
codification of international legal rules as well as to corroborate a 
divide between form and substance in the realm of state 
responsibility. A historiography of the distinction is necessary in 
order to provide elements for future reflections on the codification 
of international law and to assert that a conception of state 
responsibility rules as secondary ones is contingent upon time. 
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International lawyers have usually assumed that the distinction between primary and 
secondary rules in the law of state responsibility is a necessary one. Such assumption, however, 
tends not only to an oversimplification of the distinction but a de-politicization of state 
responsibility rules.  
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It is redundant to state the importance of the chapter of state responsibility for international 
lawyers. Such importance is due to the fact not only that, as famously put by Max Huber, 
“responsibility is the necessary corollary of rights,”1 but also because, if we pay regard to its 
long consideration in the codification works of the United Nations International Law 
Commission (ILC), we will conclude that “the topic was anything but innocent from a political 
point of view.”2 
The entanglement between law and politics is both one of the leading causes of the 
importance of the issue of state responsibility to the practice of international law as well as the 
reason for several controversies around it. 
Among the aspects of the topic that is not enough problematised from the perspective of 
the necessary connection between law and politics is the one related to the distinction between 
primary and secondary rules.3 
Since at least the Italian jurist, Roberto Ago, was elected Special Rapporteur for State 
Responsibility in the ILC, scholarship in this field has progressively taken for granted that state 
responsibility rules have nothing to do (or should have nothing to do) with substantive rules.4 
Instead, state responsibility rules would be only concerned with the determination about the 
violation of an international obligation and the consequences arising due to such violation.  
Although the choice for encapsulating state responsibility rules in the realm of secondary 
rules may seem a technical issue – or the only framework in which codification projects in this 
domain can be successful, as Ago suggested in order to justify the methodology he was trying 
 
1 AD HOC ARBITRATION. Affaire des Biens Britanniques au Maroc Espagnol (Great Britain v. Spain (Spanish 
Zone of Morocco)), Judgment of 23 October 1924. Reports of International Arbitral Awards II. New York: United 
Nations, 2006, p. 641. 
2 ALLOT, Philip. State Responsibility and the Unmaking of International Law. Harvard International Law 
Journal, Cambridge, v. 29, n. 1, 1988, p. 3. 
3 Although authors disagree about the importance of the distinction to the law of state responsibility, they usually 
do not pay regard to its political implications. See, for example, David, for whom “it concerns a distinction the 
object of which was initially a technical one, but whose application has at times seemed artificial.” DAVID, Eric. 
Primary and Secondary Rules. In: CRAWFORD, James; PELLET, Alain and OLLESON, Simon (Eds.). The Law 
of International Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 27; and P.M. Dupuy, who uses 
the distinction (in the sense proposed by H.L.A. Hart) as a fundamental methodological pillar in his General Course 
given at the Hague Academy of International Law, but sees its implications strictly to the international legal 
system: DUPUY, Pierre-Marie. L’Unité de l’Ordre Juridique International, Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de 
Droit International de la Haye, La Haye, v. 297, 2002, p. 9-490. 
4 Some authors have mentioned a legal scholar’s “habit of referring to the law of state responsibility as a set of 
secondary rules.” LINDERFALK, Ulf. State Responsibility and the Primary-Secondary Rules Terminology – The 
Role of Language for an Understanding of the International Legal System. Nordic Journal of International Law, 





to sell to his colleagues at the ILC – it has profound political consequences, in the sense that it 
affects our conceptions of what constitutes a good or bad international community.  
The association of state responsibility rules with secondary ones has often meant that 
advancing in the split between the general and the particular,5 as well as the form and the 
substance is something good for the development of international law. More than that, the 
distinction often means that state responsibility rules belong to the domain of the legal, with no 
or scarce interference from the domain of politics.  
The distinction between primary and secondary rules in the law of state responsibility has 
also produced a kind of reading of the past that emphasises the heroism of some characters and 
a favourable judgment of their choices. Hence, in many senses, the historiography of state 
responsibility is based upon teleological narratives and on the idea of progress.6 
 
5 On this issue, see GOURGOURINIS, Anastasios. General/Particular International Law and Primary/Secondary 
Rules: Unitary Terminology of a Fragmented System. European Journal of International Law, Firenze, v. 22, n. 
4, 2011, p. 993-1026. 
6 One can think, for example, of James Crawford’s criticism of the treatment some classic writers devoted to state 
responsibility for its lack of “any systematic order basis” and its characterization as merely being “an incident of 
substantive law.” CRAWFORD, James. State Responsibility: The General Part. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013, p. 3. Such view suggests that the distinction between formal and substantive rules (or 
secondary and primary rules) is an inevitable path to be taken by international lawyers. Combacau and Alland 
consider that the previous focus, by the ILC, on damages caused to aliens, was an “error”, naturalizing a distinction 
that comes from a specific methodological approach chosen among many. COMBACAU, J. and ALLAND, D. 
“Primary” and “Secondary” Rules in the Law of State Responsibility: Categorizing International Obligations. 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, Amsterdam, v. 16, 1985, p. 83. For Pellet, the adoption of the 
distinction is such an improvement that deserves the label of “genius”: “Distancing himself from this debate [on 
the responsibility of the state for injuries caused to aliens] was Ago’s first stroke of genius.” PELLET, Alain. The 
ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility for International Wrongful Acts and Related Texts. In: CRAWFORD, 
James; PELLET, Alain and OLLESON, Simon (Eds.). The Law of International Responsibility. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 76. Gaja considers the distinction “[o]ne of the major contributions of 
Roberto Ago to the study of the international responsibility of States as Special Rapporteur of the International 
Law Commission on State Responsibility” and “a highly innovative step”. GAJA, Giorgio. Primary and Secondary 
Rules in the International Law on State Responsibility. Rivista di Diritto Internazionale, Milano, v. 98, n. 4, 2014, 
p. 981. A recent trend of scholarship, however, have tried to demystify a number of aspects related to state 
responsibility. That is the case, for example, of Kathryn Greenman’s study on the historiography of state 
responsibility for acts of rebels in Latin America. Greenman’s article is a well-documented research that reveals 
strong ties between doctrine, arbitration practice and colonialism in the Americas. See GREENMAN, Kathryn. 
Aliens in Latin America: Intervention, Arbitration and State Responsibility of Rebels. Leiden Journal of 
International Law. Leiden, v. 31, n. 4, 2018, p. 617-639. A brilliant example of this new critical input in the 
historiography of state responsibility is: NISSEL, Tzvika Alan. A History of State Responsibility: The Struggle for 
International Standards (1870-1960). 436p. Doctoral Dissertation – Faculty of Law, University of Helsinki, 2016. 
Nissel’s impressive research encompasses an almost one hundred-year range of theory and practice of state 
responsibility, with an acute sense for establishing links between broad transformations in the international order 
and developments in the law of state responsibility. A good summary of his Dissertation may be found in NISSEL, 






Here, the stage of the organization of state responsibility rules today is seen as better than 
in the past. The finishing by the ILC of its work of codification on the issue, in 2011, is 
commonly regarded as the apex of the progress made, projecting the past as a less evolved stage 
of state responsibility rules.  
Although the issue of the distinction between primary and secondary rules could be 
addressed in many ways, including by means of a deep investigation of its intellectual origins 
in different authors, my aim is far more restricted and less ambitious. In this article, I would 
like to focus on how the distinction between primary and secondary rules emerged in the very 
works of the ILC on the topic of state responsibility. My goal is to revolve the debates, within 
the Commission, which gave rise to the distinction. Such effort can certainly highlight the fact 
that that split was one among other choices that could be made by the members of the 
Commission. If this is so, it is dangerous to naturalise it as the only (or even the best) way to 
conceive state responsibility rules. Such naturalization is something that states should be aware 
of when (and if) they decide to craft a convention on the responsibility of states in the future. 
Perhaps the challenging of such naturalization can stimulate widespread research on such 
important topic.  
Any investigation on the emergence of the distinction between primary and secondary rules 
in the law of state responsibility, within the ILC, has inevitably to deal with its “beginnings”. 
In this article, I use the term “beginnings” in a mere chronological sense. I do not imply that, at 
the level of ideas, the “beginnings” can easily be distinguished from present times. Although 
contexts in which meanings emerge are invariably chronologically distinguishable, the meaning 
we attribute to a given concept may have a higher resemblance to another that is farther than 
one that is closer in time.7 Such caveat is necessary because, finding the beginnings of a concept 
in a way as to keep the past entirely apart from the present is an escape to reify it, to deny that 
different meanings of a given concept in the past affects the way we understand those very 
concepts.  
This article is divided into two parts. In the first, I will discuss many of the aspects of the 
methodology chosen by the ILC to approach the topic of state responsibility since its creation 
 
7 Different theorists of history have emphasized such an idea. See, e.g., Koselleck: “Because they can be applied 
again and again, basic concepts accumulate long-term meanings that are not lost with every change in regime or 
social situation.” KOSELLECK, Reinhart. A Response to Comments on the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. In: 
LEHMANN, Hartmut and RICHTER, Melvin (Eds.). The Meaning of Historical Terms and Concepts: New Studies 





until the beginning of the 1960s. In the second part, I will trace some lines on how the ILC 
finally came to the adoption of the terms “primary” and “secondary” rules in its works on state 
responsibility, primarily by the influence of Roberto Ago. Finally, conclusions will be 
presented. 
 
1 THE ILC’S FIRST YEARS AND THE TOPIC OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
 
For the first session of the International Law Commission, in 1949, the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations provided a lengthy memorandum. Only in 1960, the authorship of the 
piece was attributed to Hersch Lauterpacht.8 
On the part devoted to state responsibility, the memorandum already shows a tension that 
would be present in the ILC discussions on the topic until, at least, 1963. Recalling previous 
codification projects, it recognised that state responsibility for damages caused to the persons 
and property of aliens covers “perhaps the major part of the law of State Responsibility,” 
constituting “in practice the most conspicuous application of the law of responsibility of States.” 
At the same time, it stated that “it is clear that that branch of international law transcends the 
question of responsibility for the treatment of aliens.” It then urged the ILC to deal with issues 
such as the criminal responsibility of states and individuals, prohibition of abuse of rights, forms 
of reparation, penal damages, and responsibility for states activities in the commercial and 
economic fields.9  
Such tension was somehow reflected in the 1949 session debates.  
Besides state responsibility, the treatment of aliens was another topic considered as apt for 
codification. In such context, a first debate emerged on the ILC. The Commission’s Chairman, 
Manley Hudson, proposed to link up the issues, “since the State responsibility visualised was 
connected with damages caused to aliens.” Such position, however, was rejected by other 
members. For Scelle, for example, “the question of State responsibility was subordinate to that 
of the treatment of aliens since the responsibility only arose if the State was under an obligation 
 
8 Elihu Lauterpacht recalls that history in the Collected Papers of his father, where a reproduction of the 
memorandum can be found. See LAUTERPACHT, Elihu (Ed.). International Law: Being the Collected Papers of 
Hersch Lauterpacht, v. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970, p. 445.  





to treat aliens in a certain way.” Despite the Chairman’s position, the Commission decided to 
keep with the topic of treatment of aliens separated from state responsibility.10 
A second debate had to do with the desirability of keeping the topic of state responsibility 
itself as one apt for codification. Three options were discernible at the time. For the first, 
advanced by Cordova, the Commission should retain the issue, but not in a limited way as to 
responsibility for damages caused to aliens, but studying “all infringements of the duties 
incumbent on States.” A second position, espoused by François, recalling the failure of the 
attempt of codification in such domain in the 1930 Hague Conference, opted for not considering 
the topic as a ready one. A third position, advocated by Brierly, Spiropoulos, and Scelle, was 
for retaining the topic due to its importance, but not mentioning if it should be focused on 
damages to aliens or on “all infringements of the duties incumbent on States.” The third position 
prevailed, and the topic of state responsibility was retained with no further qualifications.11 
If we connect the discussions on the two topics, it is clear that, for some members, the topic 
of state responsibility should be addressed under the framework of damages caused to aliens.  
In 1953, the General Assembly approved a resolution requesting the ILC to “undertake the 
codification of the principles of international law governing State responsibility.”12 However, 
that resolution, initially proposed by the Cuban Delegation, provided no orientation as to the 
methodology to be followed.  
In 1954, Francisco V. Garcia Amador, the member from Cuba, presented a memorandum 
to the ILC with several considerations about the resolution approved by the General Assembly. 
On that memorandum, he raised some issues that would inform many of his reports in the 
following years as Special Rapporteur for state responsibility. Some of them were: the need to 
recognise the subjectivity of individuals and their locus standi in international courts, the 
growing influence of human rights and the distinction between merely wrongful and punishable 
acts. He also envisaged a study on state responsibility that encompassed not only damages 
caused to aliens but also damages caused directly to states. It is true that he saw fewer 
difficulties in matters regarding damages caused to aliens, because, in such domain, there were 
more developments in doctrine as well as in practice. More, he thought that most of the 
 
10 ILC. Summary Records of the First Session. Yearbook of the ILC v. 1, 1949, p. 46.  
11 Ibidem, p. 49-50. 
12 UNITED NATIONS. GENERAL ASSEMBLY. Request for the Codification of the Principles of International 





fundamental principles of state responsibility could be found in the domain of damages caused 
to aliens. However, he did not exclude the codification work beyond that reach. His approach 
is better described as “a gradualist” one.13  
Due to its workload, only in 1955 the ILC began the study of state responsibility by 
choosing Garcia Amador as the Special Rapporteur for the topic.14 No substantive discussions, 
however, took place at that year on the topic.  
Garcia Amador presented his first report in 1956. In its first pages, he admittedly assumed 
a “liberal” attitude towards codification, in the sense that “it is necessary to change and adapt 
traditional law so that it will reflect the profound transformation which has occurred in 
international law.” By presenting the past attempts to codify the law of state responsibility, he 
saw the role of the ILC as to “continue and complete the work of predecessor organizations.”15 
So, despite his “liberal” conception about codification, his methodology was one of continuity.  
Important for the Special Rapporteur is what he calls “function of the principles governing 
state responsibility.” For him, such function was, “in a certain sense,” even more important than 
the content of state responsibility itself. Quoting authors such as Dunn, Jessup, Eagleton, and 
Eustathiades, he mentions the connections of the topic with the “possibility of maintaining a 
unified economic and social order for the conduct of international trade”, “political influence 
in certain countries”, “scramble for markets”, “imperialism”, “dollar diplomacy”, effects of 
international wrongful acts in the “whole community”. Such elements were essential for him to 
raise the idea that the function of international law had changed as to “protect the rights and 
interests of its other subjects who may properly claim its protection.”16 
Taking into regard such importance Garcia Amador attributed to the “function” of state 
responsibility, he admittedly envisaged in state responsibility a political function beyond the 
confines of what would be a “strict legal approach.”  
The report develops the issues brought by his previous memorandum and reaffirms the 
gradual approach: “[t]he Commission, as it has done in the case of other topics, should adopt a 
gradual approach, codifying first that part of the topic which is most ripe for codification and 
 
13 MÜLLER, Daniel. The Work of García Amador on State Responsibility for Injury Caused to Aliens.  In:  
CRAWFORD, James; PELLET, Alain and OLLESON, Simon (Eds.). The Law of International Responsibility. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 70. 
14 ILC. Summary Records of the Seventh Session. Yearbook of the ILC, v. 1, 1955, p. 190. 
15 ILC. International Responsibility: Report by F.V. García Amador, Special Rapporteur. Yearbook of the ILC, v. 
2, 1956, p. 176-177.  





which, at the same time, should receive priority in conformity with the terms of resolution 799 
(VIII) of the General Assembly. The “responsibility of States for damage caused to the person 
or property of aliens would appear to fulfill these two conditions”.17 
Garcia Amador’s first report gave rise to many discussions in the ILC’s plenary meetings. 
Apart from one member (Hsu) – for whom the scope of the report was too restricted and should 
be broadened18 - the strongest criticisms were not raised against its methodology, but against 
the introduction by the report of issues such as state criminality, individual as a subject of 
international law and human rights. Members such as Zourek criticised the report for going too 
far and dealing with “aspects of international responsibility in general.” Spiropoulos stated that 
it “covered the entire field of state responsibility.”19 Fitzmaurice explicitly supported the special 
rapporteur’s view of adopting a gradual approach. 
Because the vast majority of the Commission did not oppose the gradual approach, it would 
be expected that Garcia Amador would follow it in his second report. That was what happened 
in 1957.20 
The membership in the ILC was renewed that year. Three of the new members would 
assume, in the years to come, a prominent role in criticizing the focus on responsibility for 
damages caused to aliens: Grigory Tunkin, Alfred Verdross and Roberto Ago.  
One of the first interventions in that year’s debates shows that Garcia Amador’s approach 
was not yet a problem to the Commission. Amado, from Brazil, congratulated him for removing 
“the tendency to undue broadening of the concept of responsibility.”21 
It was only on the second intervention that the stage started to be set to a more intense 
debate, although not yet related to the methodology of the study. For Padilla Nervo, “the 
doctrine of State responsibility became a legal cloak for the imperialist interests of the 
international oligarchy during the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth.” 
Specifically related to the methodology, Hsu - the same and only member that criticised Garcia 
Amador for not broadening the scope of his first report in the 1956 debates – emphasized that 
“the Special Rapporteur was on the right track.”22 
 
17 Ibidem, p. 221.  
18 ILC. Summary Records of the Eight Session. Yearbook of the ILC, v. 1, 1956, p. 232.  
19 Ibidem, p. 233, 237, 241. 
20 ILC. International Responsibility: Second Report by F.V. García Amador, Special Rapporteur. Yearbook of the 
ILC, v. 2, 1957, p. 104. 
21 ILC. Summary Records of the Ninth Session. Yearbook of the ILC, v. 1, 1957, p. 154. 





The first member to undoubtedly challenge, in the 1957 discussions, Garcia Amador’s 
approach was Roberto Ago. In many ways, Ago’s position directly influenced the debates 
because he introduced the question of the methodology taken by the special rapporteur and, 
thus, tried to re-open an issue that was, at least for the majority of the ILC in its previous session, 
already closed: “[t]he Special Rapporteur had concentrated, in accordance with the 
Commission's recommendation, on the question of the responsibility of the State for damage 
caused in its territory to the person or property of aliens, a very important aspect of the problem, 
and one which had been given long consideration by doctrine. Its codification would be a most 
useful task. Though it was an aspect that lent itself to separate treatment, it was, as the Special 
Rapporteur had himself discovered, impossible to study it without raising all the fundamental 
problems and defining all the concepts connected with the general notion of State 
responsibility”.23 
If we compare Ago’s statement with that of Hsu in 1956, the former is the first to put in a 
clear way a distinguishing between a “general notion of State responsibility” and “damage 
caused in its territory to the person or property of aliens.” Moreover, he admits that the Special 
Rapporteur’s approach was “in accordance with the Commission's recommendation.”24 
In the next meetings during the same session, many members tried to make correlations 
between the issue of state responsibility and questions relating to colonialism and eurocentrism 
in international law and the emergence of different economic systems. Thus, “international law 
was no longer the almost exclusive preserve of the peoples of European blood” (Pal). The 
codification process should not “merely ensure the protection of vested interests or the 
maintenance of the status quo” (El Erian), and “[p]resent-day international law could not be a 
system of legal rules imposed by States belonging to one economic system on States belonging 
to another” (Tunkin).25 Apparently replying to those statements, Fitzmaurice was clear about 
the need to separate politics from law and stressed that the role of the ILC belonged to the latter 
domain. He thus stated: “the subject was one which immediately touched off strong emotional 
 
23 Ibidem, p. 157. 
24 Such statement is in clear contradiction with the narrative Ago would craft, years later, of the Garcia Amador's 
years: “the Special Rapporteur submitted a second report which was expressly limited, even in its title, to 
responsibility of the State for injuries caused in its territory to the person or property of aliens.” ILC. First Report 
on State Responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur. Yearbook of the ILC, v. 2, 1969, p. 133.  





charges, and the tendency to approach it from a political and ideological standpoint, entirely 
inappropriate in a commission of jurists, appeared to be irresistible.”26 
Ago’s second intervention in the debates, while trying to put some order in the discussions, 
and possibly with a “commanding demeanor,”27 epitomises his whole methodology for the 
codification of the law of state responsibility. For him: “Some speakers had been more 
concerned with the essentially technical and legal side of international responsibility […]; 
others had emphasized the political aspects of certain questions which had been dealt with by 
the Special Rapporteur, and which concerned only indirectly the question of responsibility. As 
far as he could see, the Commission had the choice of three courses. Firstly, it could adopt the 
radical course of stating that, for various reasons, the subject was not ripe for codification. 
Secondly, it could deal with the subject covered by the report in all the aspects touched on by 
the Special Rapporteur, following the tendency, found in many works on international 
responsibility for damages suffered by foreigners, to widen the subject to include all the 
substantive rules regarding the treatment of aliens. There was, of course, nothing to prevent the 
Commission's adopting that course, but he himself doubted the wisdom of undertaking such a 
wide task, which would involve considering and defining all the obligations of States towards 
aliens before studying the consequences of violations thereof, and settling not only the technical 
and legal problems involved but the political ones as well though the latter might not present 
such insuperable difficulties as some supposed. Thirdly, the Commission could, as advocated 
by the Chairman, leave all the matters concerning the definition of the obligations of the State 
as to the conditions of aliens, and confine itself to the examination of the questions within the 
framework of responsibility proper, i.e., of the consequences of an international illicit act 
committed in the field under consideration. Of those three courses, Mr. Ago preferred the third, 
which would enable the Commission to do a useful job without engaging in a debate on the 
treatment of aliens, a subject on which it might prove sometimes impossible to reach agreement, 
and which, in any case, could usefully be allowed to evolve further before attempting to codify 
it.”28 
The richness of such intervention is clear for the historiography of the law of state 
responsibility. At this point, however, two points need to be stressed.  
 
26 Ibidem, p. 163. 
27 NISSEL, Alan. The Duality of State Responsibility, Op. Cit., p. 827. 





Ago makes a distinction, in the project of codifying rules on state responsibility, between 
positions that are legal and technical from those that are political in nature. He does not only 
square himself on the “legal and technical side,” but puts Garcia Amador's approach on the 
“political” side. Here, he makes use of a dichotomy that makes his ideas on the codification 
project distinct from those of Garcia Amador at the level of the fundamentals. Although 
delimiting the space of law and politics is in itself a political project, nothing suggests that, in 
making such statement, Ago had a “hidden” political agenda. However, such guidance would 
have consequences regarding delimiting a field of study and excluding a perspective more 
“politically-oriented” on the topic.  
Second, Ago seems to misrepresent the position of the Chairman; he is, in fact, 
projecting his own position on the path to be taken in the codification process by referring to 
the position “advocated by the Chairman.”  
Jaroslav Zourek, the then Chairman of the ILC, criticised the rapporteur's “attempt to 
cover the entire subject of the legal status of aliens in all its substantive aspects, instead of 
contenting himself with the technical rules that were usually regarded as exhausting the subject 
of State responsibility.” In this context, he states that: “the Commission should study only the 
circumstances in which the State could be held responsible for an act which gave rise to 
damages and a claim from a foreign State, without engaging in a study of the rules governing 
the juridical condition of foreigners on the territory of the State”.29 
In other words, the Chairman seems to visualise a codification project that does not lay 
down rules that deal with “juridical condition of foreigners,” but that is, at the same time, in the 
domain of damages caused to aliens.30 Although Ago’s intervention was dealing both with the 
oppositions between general and particular, and substance and form, Zourek is only targeting 
the second one. It is possible to come to such conclusion by the following statement, made by 
François, who criticised not article 1 of Garcia Amador’s proposed rules (that defined state 
responsibility concerning damages caused to aliens), but article 6, that, in his vision, defined 
violations of fundamental human rights).  
Indeed, it is plausible to admit that, at that session, there were four, and not three (as put 
by Ago), the positions about the codification process on the part of the members of the ILC; the 
 
29 Ibidem, p. 162. 
30 This is so, since in another intervention, just before that of Ago, the Chairman gives examples of state 





fourth was for keeping the focus on damages caused to aliens without providing any substantive 
rules.  
That fourth position was followed by some members (Amado, Spiropoulos), and also 
the Commission’s Secretary (Liang), that focused only on the necessary distinction between 
rules of substance and those of responsibility (procedural).31 Although some emphasised the 
difficulty in advancing such division in practice (Spiropoulos and Fitzmaurice).32  
Other members explicitly adopted the third path – followed by Ago – but with a nuance 
that would be very relevant for the discussions to come, that of “dealing with any new principles 
enunciated in the Charter on which no clear rules of international law existed” (El-Erian), 
something that was, although not clearly, in the statement made by Tunkin.33 
During the debates, Garcia Amador himself complained about the bewildering ideas that 
were being brought by the members. In his words, “[h]e found himself, nonetheless, in an 
unenviable position because of the contradiction between certain criticisms.” In a statement that 
could be seen as a response to Ago, he did not deny a “political consideration” in state 
responsibility, but found that “such difficulties was no reason for abandoning the task of seeking 
out its basic principles.” He also addressed the proposals of delimiting substantive and 
procedural aspects and stated that they were interrelated.34 
At the end of the debate, the Chairman, addressing to a question posed by Matine-
Daftary that the Commission had to decide if it would be restricted to the issue of “protection 
of aliens” or would broad the study to encompass “all types of international obligations,” 
answered that it was “settled, since the title of the draft referred only to injury to the person and 
property of aliens.”35 
There were members, although, in the minority, that showed full approval for Garcia 
Amador’s “choice of topic and method of approach” and opposed the “undue limitation of 
scope” of his next report (Yokota).36 
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The 1957 debates show that there was growing opposition to the approach followed by 
Garcia Amador. However, because of their variety, a common or majoritarian position by the 
ILC could hardly be envisaged.  
Thus, in his third report (1958), Garcia Amador did not change in any relevant way the 
approach he decided to take since his first report, stressing the difficulty of separating 
substantive and procedural aspects in the topic.37 
In 1958, however, the ILC did not discuss, not even cursory, Garcia Amador’s report. 
The focus on other topics was the official reason for that.  
In the following year, the special rapporteur presented his fourth report.38 However, the 
debates among members were formally focused on discussing the draft articles on state 
responsibility prepared by Harvard Law School, because the ILC’s Secretary, since the 
beginnings of the Commission’s work on the topic, had established contacts with that 
institution.  
For Tunkin, both the Harvard’s articles as well as the reports by the Special Rapporteur 
did not deal with state responsibility properly, but with rights of aliens. He also urged for the 
ILC to take the views of socialist states as well as of new states of Asia and Africa on state 
responsibility. In a similar vein, the Yugoslavian member, Milan Bartoš, linked up the approach 
of responsibility for damages caused to aliens with colonialism and imperialism.39 
The Iranian member, Matine-Daftary, was direct in explaining an additional reason why 
the Special Rapporteur's reports had not been thoroughly discussed so far: “the Special 
Rapporteur's draft had been postponed not only owing to lack of time, but also because the draft 
was based on purely European standards of justice.”40 Perhaps that was only a partial 
explanation because many other members had reservations towards the reports for different 
reasons. In any case, it seems to confirm that the continuous postponement was in Pellet's 
words, “a polite representation of a more complex reality.”41 
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Alfred Verdross urged for the separation of the topics of “international responsibility in 
general” and the “rights of aliens”.42 He was immediately seconded by Roberto Ago, for whom, 
“the test of the State's responsibility was not the injury to the alien, but the violation of an 
obligation.”43 
However, even after Verdross and Ago’s interventions with a more “technical” tone, the 
political considerations continued being a point. Thus, for El-Khouri, the Harvard draft articles 
“were reminiscent of the capitulations system applied in the territories of the Ottoman Empire 
in the nineteenth century.”44 
Still, in those cursory debates of 1959, some seemed to support the idea of still focusing 
the codification works on damages caused to aliens. That is seen in Amado’s and the Secretary’s 
positions, and possibly in Zourek’s as well.45  
The presentation of a draft made by an American institution such as the Harvard Law 
School fueled many suspicious feelings in a topic that had already been accused of being 
supportive of imperialist and colonialist ideas. 
Garcia Amador’s fifth report46 was discussed in the 1960 session, which counted with 
the presentation of Mr. Gómez Robledo, representative of the Inter-American Juridical 
Committee. He reported the works of that Committee, that was entrusted by the Tenth Inter-
American Conference of 1954 to study the American Continent’s contribution to the 
development and codification of the principles of state responsibility. Louis Sohn also spoke 
about the changes made in the Harvard draft taking into regard the debates on the ILC in the 
previous year.47  
Two of the first to intervene in the debates were, again, in sequence, Verdross, and Ago. 
Remarking that the Harvard draft and the special rapporteur's reports, dealt indistinctively with 
state responsibility and treatments of aliens, both pleaded (again) for the ILC to separate the 
issues in its works.48 Tunkin also argued for the separation of issues, although he added that 
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“[i]n approaching the codification and progressive development of international law, the 
primary consideration must be the laws of the development of human society.”49  
Garcia Amador replied to Tunkin by stating that: “his reports contained detailed 
explanations of the difference between the two subjects of state responsibility properly so called 
and the legal status of aliens. The clear distinction between the two had never been questioned 
in a public or private codification, and he was therefore surprised that the matter should have 
been raised by a member of the International Law Commission”.50 
The most amazing aspect about Garcia Amador’s statement is his belief that the 
separation of subjects had never been raised in the codification process at the ILC, once, as 
already seen, since 1949 the question was on the table.  
The 1960 brief debates show that the lack of consensus within the Commission persisted 
and nothing was being done to revert the situation.  
Garcia Amador presented his sixth (and last) report, in 1961.51 
Under the chairmanship of Grigory Tunkin, the ILC did not debate the topic of state 
responsibility in 1961. One of the reasons might be that tensions were aggravated by the fact 
that, in 1960, much criticism was raised in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly 
against the approach adopted by the Special Rapporteur. However, the Commission heard 
Professor Sohn, that made a short statement about the Harvard draft. No floor was given to the 
members.52 
Speaking on a meeting devoted to the future work of Commission, Garcia Amador 
grasped the opportunity and made a powerful statement, taking especially into account the 
criticisms he, the Secretariat and the Commission itself suffered from delegations of states that, 
in his words, “had never been concerned with the development and codification of international 
law.” He refuted accusations stated at the Sixth Committee that his collaboration with the 
Harvard Law School was in the nature of consultation, not collaboration. At the moment he 
started to speak about the criticisms made by delegations at the Sixth Committee, Tunkin 
intervened and asked Garcia Amador to “keep within the limits of the subject under 
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consideration [future codification of international law].”53 Having the word again, Garcia 
Amador poses a striking question, suggesting that the postponement in the debate about the 
topic was deliberate: “The Assembly, in resolution 799 (VIII) of 1953 had requested the 
Commission to undertake the codification as soon as it thought advisable. Two years later, the 
Commission had elected the Special Rapporteur, who had submitted his first report in 1956, 
when the Commission's agenda had become appreciably lighter since it had finished the draft 
on the law of the sea. Since that time there had only been two items on its agenda of which the 
Assembly had specifically requested codification: diplomatic immunities and State 
responsibility, except for the revision of the draft on arbitral procedures. During those six years, 
many delegations had repeatedly stressed the importance of carrying the codification of State 
responsibility further, as had done recently the United Nations Commission on Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources. How was it then that the Commission, which had 
produced such fruitful work in its first six years, had continually deferred the study and 
codification of the topic of State responsibility?”54 
Zourek was one of the only members to reply, stating that Garcia Amador was the one 
to be blamed, because he failed in considering in his reports the Commission’s debate in 1956. 
He then supported that the topic should focus first on the “general principles governing the 
responsibility of States.” Only after that, the ILC should proceed to other fields. He then seems 
to equate the “general principles” with “the violation of the rules of international law which 
were essential for the maintenance of international peace and security and which were laid down 
specifically in articles 1 and 2 of the Charter.” Such position resembles that advocated by 
Tunkin, but not that one advanced by Ago and Verdross.55  
The Secretary also intervened to state that, at the outset of the work on the topic, it was 
agreed that the ILC would “be limited to the question of the responsibility of the State for 
injuries caused in its territory to aliens.”56  
The debates in 1961 show a growing deadlock among members. Moreover, Garcia 
Amador’s position as Special Rapporteur had become delicate.  
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In 1962, Garcia Amador was no longer a member of the ILC. That opened a window of 
opportunity for it to re-start the study on state responsibility afresh. 
The debates happened within the agenda item concerning the General Assembly’s 
Resolution 1686 (XVI),57 which recommended the Commission to continue its work on specific 
topics, including state responsibility.  
Verdross was once again one of the first to intervene. Coherently with his previous 
positions, he was in favour of studying the topic of “general principles of state responsibility,” 
excluding that of treatment of aliens.58  
An opposing view was that of the American jurist, Herbert Briggs, recently elected to 
the ILC, for whom, a specific aspect of the topic should be chosen. He tried to disqualify the 
approach on “general principles” because of its abstract nature, divorced from state 
responsibility's “roots in actual international life.”59  
The Uruguayan Jimenez de Aréchaga followed Briggs’ conclusions, but for different 
reasons. He saw in keeping the focus on damages caused to aliens an opportunity to tackle 
colonialist and imperialist aspects of state responsibility.60 
Besides Briggs and Jiménez de Aréchaga, Tsuruoka, Cadieux, and Liu were for keeping, 
for different reasons, the focus on damages caused to aliens.61  
But a majority started to be shaped around Verdross’ proposal. Members such as 
Yassen, Bartoš, Castrén, Paredes, Rosenne, Waldock, Gros, and, of course, Ago, manifested 
for excluding the issue of damages caused to aliens and dealing with the general principles.62 
Tunkin positioned himself also for excluding damages caused to aliens, but in a way 
explicitly diverse as to Ago: “The Commission would have to take the topic of state 
responsibility as a whole and examine it in the light of recent developments in international life 
and international law.” And he added: “[t]he aspects of state responsibility cited by Mr. Ago 
did exist, but those were traditional aspects.” New developments, for him, were related to 
“responsibility for acts which endangered the peace or constituted a breach of the peace, and 
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responsibility for acts impeding the struggle of colonial peoples for independence.”63 However, 
he made explicit that what he meant was not being limited to “general principles” since “the 
Commission should go much further.”  
Such position by Tunkin, which apparently was followed by Tabibi,64 if adopted by the 
ILC, could lead to the same critique as to the supporters of the focus on damages caused to 
aliens, because it would leave a lack – of all other aspects not directly related to the maintenance 
of peace and colonialism.  
At the end of the debates, the Commission decided to establish a sub-committee on state 
responsibility “to define the scope of the topic of state responsibility and that no directives had 
been given to it by the Commission itself.” It was composed by Ago (Chairman), Briggs, Gros, 
Jiménez de Aréchaga, Lachs, de Luna, Paredes, Tsuruoka, Tunkin, and Yassen.65 
In the same year of 1962, the sub-committee gathered and decided to “be devoted 
primarily [but not exclusively] to the general aspects of State responsibility” – without a 
specification of the meaning of such generality - and that members would prepare memoranda 
to inform the debates. It was also decided that it would meet in January 1963.  
And so it did. The sub-committee received memoranda from Jiménez de Aréchaga, 
Paredes, Gros, Tsuruoka, Yassen and Ago. After just four meetings, it reached a unanimous 
decision to “give priority to the definition of the general rules governing the international 
responsibility of the State,” without limiting itself to the issue of responsibility for damages 
caused to aliens.66 The sub-committee also approved an outline program of work, based on 
Ago’s paper proposals.67 
In its 1963 session, the Commission took note of the Report of the President of the sub-
committee and no clear opposition was raised by any member to its conclusions; on the 
contrary, many compliments were given to the sub-committee and its Chairman. The 
subcommittee's report was adopted in full and, by acclamation, Roberto Ago was appointed as 
Special Rapporteur for state responsibility.68 The “Ago Revolution” was about to start.  
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However, before going into the role that the distinction between primary and secondary 
rules played in the so-called “Ago Revolution,” it is important to make two general remarks 
about the Garcia Amador’s years.  
In the 1962 debates, Manfred Lachs, while commenting on the ILC future methods of 
work on state responsibility made a sharp criticism against the Commission that seems to 
explain, succinctly and intelligently, what happened between 1956 and 1961. For him, “[o]ne 
mistake had been to leave the special rapporteur without any guidance from the Commission, 
with the consequence that the report submitted reflected only the special rapporteur's personal 
opinions.” The criticism was soon dismissed by the Chairman, claiming the “pressure of other 
work.”69 But the fact remains that, already in 1961, Garcia Amador had shown that the reports 
could have been fully appreciated.  
The historiography on the law of state responsibility has accepted without second 
thoughts that the failure of the codification project during the Garcia Amador’s years is mainly 
due to an “unsuitable approach”70 taken by the then special rapporteur towards the codification 
of international law. The Cuban jurist was even accused of causing a deadlock in the 
codification project because of his “strategic clumsiness.”71 The picture is much more complex 
than those narratives. They seem to be teleologically framed to idealise the work of Ago and 
the framework in which the ILC’s articles on state responsibility, finally approved in 2011, are 
based upon.72 
If Garcia Amador failed as a special rapporteur, so did the Commission itself.  
It is a fact that Garcia Amador insisted in many (but not in all) aspects of his conception 
about the codification of the law of state responsibility as envisaged in his first report and even 
in the memorandum he addressed to the ILC in 1954. However, apart from certain aspects – 
such as that on wrongful acts that should be punished – the Commission as a whole provided 
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no specific guidance for his future work. Much criticism was raised against his ideas, but some 
members supported him in many respects. In every single year he acted as Special Rapporteur, 
Garcia Amador presented reports that were cursory or even not considered by the Commission. 
If that was a deliberate strategy by some members to isolate the special rapporteur – as seems 
to suggest Matine-Daftary's intervention in 1959 – the Commission had the duty at least to 
appoint a new Special Rapporteur.  
Someone could argue that Garcia Amador was not sufficiently politically acute in 
realizing he was increasingly being isolated within the ILC. Perhaps this is true, but only 
partially. There were so many paths to be taken (four at least, taking the general and often 
confusing statements by ILC members during the years) that choosing one could be risky if he 
did not have a precise mandate from the Commission as a whole.  
Thus, the ILC is also responsible for the failure in the codification project on state 
responsibility from 1955 to 1961.  
Another general remark is related to the role played by the ideological confrontations in 
the failure of the Garcia Amador’s approach.  
It is undeniable that, even in 1956, the ideological confrontation was a big issue in the 
ILC’s debates. However, if we consider the evolution of the debates within the Commission, 
we conclude that ideological arguments were quite independent of “technical” ones. 
Sometimes, they were opposed to each other.  
Ago’s intervention, in the beginning of the 1957 debates, was of a “technical nature.” 
He was trying to offer a different path to codification by separating law form politics. In other 
words, in the first moment, Ago was not attempting to bring to his side members from socialist 
and Third World countries; he was, in fact, opposing them. Perhaps he realised, after some 
years, that he could use such “politicization” in his favour. In any case, Ago’s position, 
distancing from the Garcia Amador’s approach, was not a direct result of the ideological 
confrontation.73 
Hence, it is plausible to say that Ago played an active role, since at least 1957, in tackling the 
Garcia Amador’s approach. He was the first to contest, in a clear and very intelligible fashion, 
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that approach, and was the first to oppose technical to political arguments about state 
responsibility. We cannot also underestimate the role of Verdross and Tunkin. The first also 
adopted the “technical” tone and supported Ago’s points more than once. The second pressured 
to the politicization of the topic by supporting the need for its renewal taking into regard the 
emergence of socialism and the end of colonial empires. 
 
2 THE PRIMARY/SECONDARY RULES DISTINCTION AND THE “AGO 
REVOLUTION” 
 
“Ago Revolution” is a term coined by Alain Pellet to describe Roberto Ago’s input in 
the ILC codification works on the topic of state responsibility, distancing from Garcia Amador’s 
approach.74  
For one to understand how such “revolution” took place, it is essential to go back to the 
debates in the Sub-Committee, in 1963, which were the main battlefront against the so-called 
“restricted view” of Garcia Amador.  
 
2.1 THE DEBATES WITHIN THE ILC’S SUB-COMMITTEE ON STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY 
 
As already noted, the discussions of the Sub-Committee were informed by papers 
previously presented by some of its members.  
Ago’s report is, by far, the one that most influenced the discussions of 1963. It is not the 
most extensive one, but it follows a clear strategy that put his eventual opponents in the 
awkward situation of having to revolve the whole history of the law of state responsibility to 
make plausible contestations.  
Ago admits that the bibliography, as well as the cases in international practice, are 
abundant on the topic of state responsibility regarding damages caused to aliens. However, such 
materials were based upon a critical lack, since it “is concerned chiefly with particular points 
and aspects”75 The topic of state responsibility was, thus, seen as one that did not adequately 
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assigned “to each element its true place in a systematic whole.”76 The dichotomy between parts 
and the whole (general and particular) plays an essential role in Ago’s argumentation.  
He then describes several codification projects of rules of state responsibility and finds 
a common denominator among them, one that made all fail: the “particular approach.” Ago 
does not inquire into the political reasons for the Harvard, the League of Nations or Garcia 
Amador’s projects to fail.  
This way, he applies the inadequacy of the option for the “particular approach” 
empirically to previous state responsibility codification projects. Things put this way, the 
“whole approach” remained as the one to be tested by the ILC.  
However, “the whole” is a relational concept. Its existence depends on its contrary, “the 
part.” If not removed to another semantic field, “the whole” can easily become “the part.” If 
seen as a set of organised rules, state responsibility is just a part of the whole of the international 
legal rules. A possible transformation of the whole into a part becomes possible when Ago 
states that “[m]y point is merely that any discussion of international responsibility should take 
into account the whole of responsibility and nothing but responsibility.”77 The restriction “but 
responsibility” cannot be easily reconciled with “the whole of responsibility.”  
That is why, to avoid an aporia, Ago needs to add to the equation another dichotomy, 
which is not quantitative, but qualitative: that of form and substance. In the codification efforts, 
state responsibility rules must be dealt not only as a whole but as rules that differ, by their 
nature, from others that are substantive. He, thus, pontificates: “Once again, what I wish to 
emphasise is merely that the consideration of the contents of the various rules of substance 
should not be an object in itself in the study of responsibility, and that the contents of these 
rules should be taken into account only to illustrate the consequences which may arise from an 
infringement of the rules”.78  
He does not call state responsibility rules as formal or procedural in nature; he just 
nominates their counterparts: “rules of substance.”  
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Other reports – those of Mustafa Yasseen and André Gros - adopted a similar attitude 
as Ago’s concerning supporting a widening of the scope of ILC on the topic, without, however, 
the argumentative sophistication of the Italian jurist.79 
There were, however, those that followed the opposite path. Senjin Tsuruoka proposed 
the ILC to, first, undertake the study of responsibility for damages caused to aliens and, then, 
proceed to general issues. Also, Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga produced a long paper entitled 
“The duty to compensate for the nationalization of foreign property,” possibly under the 
premise that the ILC would proceed with its focus on damages caused to aliens.80 
Such opposite views in those papers show that, until, at least, that moment, no uniform 
position was to be found within the ILC.  
The discussions also reveal that, initially, the sub-committee was still divided. Briggs 
joined Tsuruoka and Jiménez de Aréchaga (who had both previously presented papers) in 
supporting a codification project focused on damages caused to aliens. There were also mid-
term positions, such as Andre Gros’, who, at a certain stage, called for a codification in two 
steps: the first devoted to “general aspects of state responsibility,” and a second dealing with 
“responsibility of the State in particular circumstances,” something that is not clear in the paper 
he had previously presented. In his first intervention, Tunkin adopted a similar attitude to that 
he professed in many previous sessions of the Plenary of the ILC on the topic. While advocating 
that the Commission should focus on the “general principles of State responsibility,” its work 
should “consider the most important new subject [of international law] — that of the 
responsibility of States for acts of aggression” besides problems emerging from de 
decolonization process and the sovereignty of states over their natural resources. Briggs soon 
intervened to state that, by following that path, the distinction between form and substance 
proposed by other members would make no sense, because those issues would be “questions of 
substance”.81 
The historiography of state responsibility does not do proper justice to the role played 
by Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga in overcoming the deadlock in the works on the topic. Soon 
after Tunkin and Briggs (not by coincidence, the ILC members from the USSR and the USA) 
presented their positions, Jiménez de Aréchaga stated in a crystal-clear fashion: “that the 
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majority of the members of the Sub-Committee favoured the priority suggested by the 
Chairman in his paper. Mr. Briggs, Mr. Tsuruoka and he (the speaker) were thus in the minority, 
and he thought it would not serve any useful purpose to continue the discussion on method. He 
would co-operate in the work of the Sub-Committee in accordance with the method which the 
majority preferred”.82 
That was the last time, during the Sub-committee meetings, that questions relating to 
the possible focus of the ILC codification work on state responsibility for damages caused to 
aliens emerged. The surrender of the position advocated by the three members – although only 
stated by Jiménez de Aréchaga - was suddenly realised by Ago, who, without any delay, closed 
the discussions on the issue.83 As the immediate next speaker after Jiménez de Aréchaga, Ago 
first tackled the dimension of particularity in favour of generality, stating that: “the Sub-
Committee agreed that the work on State responsibility should be devoted to the general 
problems of the international responsibility of States.” He then buried the dimension of 
substance, by saying that “no attempt would be made to discuss and define certain principles of 
substantive international law, whether those principles related to old-established or to new areas 
of the law”.84 
That was also the moment when the so-called “Garcia Amador’s approach” was 
definitely expurgated from the whole of the ILC works on state responsibility. As already stated 
in the previous section, the sub-committee unanimously decided that the topic of state 
responsibility would not deal with to substantive rules; such decision was approved by the 
Plenary of the ILC. 
 
2.2 THE COMING OF THE TERMINOLOGY PRIMARY/SECONDARY RULES  
 
Apart from a brief note presented in 1967,85 Ago just presented a lengthy study as 
Special Rapporteur in 1969, the date of his first report.86 
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The piece is wholly devoted to tracing a history of different projects for the codification 
of the law of state responsibility (although almost half of it is composed of annexes compiling 
texts that resulted from that codification efforts). The narrative made by Ago in this report 
brings to the table arguments that are still regularly used today by different scholars to establish 
the avant-garde character of the Italian jurist’s imprint in the codification works.  
The strategy is clearly teleological: to prove that the reason for the failure of the previous 
codification efforts was that they did not isolate the topic of state responsibility from others. 
Such non-separation was due to two different causes: one related to progress and development 
in legal theory and, the other, for practical reasons for making a codification project to advance.  
First, by recurring to the idea of “development of international legal theory” and 
“progress” in the study of the fields of international responsibility and that of the status of aliens, 
Ago stated that, at his time, their treatment should be made separately.87 He thus brought 
progress to his side. The consequence would be that any entangled treatment of the topic would 
sound as secular, non-evolved or unscientific. Ago was justifying a fracture in time, a 
discontinuity, a new beginning. 
In parallel, he did not get rid of the practical implications of the codification work: the 
non-separation of state responsibility from other topics was one of the remaining reasons for 
the past projects to fail. In fact, he puts more emphasis on such practical implications than the 
first cause, related to “developments of international legal theory.” He thus uses stronger words 
to make his points: “unquestionably,” “undoubtedly,” “firmly believes,” the “most valuable 
lesson”: “At some stage, however, it unquestionably became essential to isolate the subject of 
responsibility stricto sensu, together with the relevant principles, and to divorce it from any 
other body of substantive rules of international law. The continued confusion of State 
responsibility with other topics was undoubtedly one of the reasons which prevented it from 
becoming ripe for codification. The Special Rapporteur firmly believes that, for purposes of 
codification, the international responsibility of the State must be considered as such, i.e., as the 
situation resulting from a State's non-fulfilment of an international legal obligation, regardless 
of the nature of that obligation and the matter to which it relates. This conclusion even seems 
to the Special Rapporteur to be the most valuable lesson to be drawn from a retrospective 
 





examination of the successive efforts to codify this important and delicate sector of international 
law”.88 
Such mixture of a sense of scientific progress with practical interest in making the 
codification project to advance is primarily at the ground of Ago’s reading of the contribution 
of Garcia Amador to the codification works on state responsibility, which composes six pages 
of the sixteen pages of the report.  
One year later, in 1970, by occasion of the presentation of his second report, Ago 
returned to the issue of the adequate methodology to be deployed by the ILC in its work on the 
topic. He then restated the difference between rules that define obligations and rules that deal 
with the violation of the previous ones and their consequences.89 Once more, he made use of a 
strategy that linked the success of the codification project to the adoption of a particular 
methodology.  
Within such framework, the use of the terminology “secondary rules” to describe the 
rules on state responsibility came as a consequence of conceiving them as rules that “determine 
whether that obligation has been violated and what should be the consequences of the 
violation.” The semantics of what constitutes a “secondary rule” was already crystal-clear, and 
the terminology deployed was more a matter of words. That is why the well-known paragraph 
of the 1970 Second Report, in which Ago introduces, for the first time, the word “secondary” 
to describe the rules on state responsibility, was the culmination of a process: “In its previous 
drafts, the Commission has generally concentrated on defining the rules of international law 
which, in one sector of inter-State relations or another, impose particular obligations on States, 
and which may, in a certain sense, be termed “primary”, as opposed to the other rules—
precisely those covering the field of responsibility—which may be termed “secondary”, 
inasmuch as they are concerned with determining the consequences of failure to fulfil 
obligations established by the primary rules”.90 
From 1973 on, several members, including Ago himself, started to use the terminology 
in a generalised fashion. In the same year, the ILC Yearbook, while presenting the topic of state 
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90 ILC. Second Report on State Responsibility by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur. Yearbook of the ILC, v. 





responsibility, for the first time stated that the Commission’s work on that regard was restricted 
to “secondary rules.”91  
It is not this article's aim to trace the origin of the terminology itself. One thing, however, 
can be said, on this respect: there is nothing in Ago’s oeuvre that suggests that he took the 
terminology from H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept of Law. More plausible would be to say that he 
took it from Alf Ross.92 
In 1947 – more than ten years before Hart’s masterwork – Ross stated in his A Textbook 
of International Law: “[…] a legal system - in contrast with moral rules – cannot stop at the 
mere act of prescribing a certain conduct as duty. In case the central primary norms of 
intercourse are contravened, it is not enough to note this and perhaps disapprove of it, but, 
according to certain rules, there arises a definite responsibility for the contravener of the duty. 
The primary rules must therefore be supplemented by secondary rules relating to breaches of 
law and responsibility.”93 
With small adaptations, such statement could be attributed to Roberto Ago himself. 
Furthermore, it is out of question that Ago was acquainted with Ross’ book, since he 
makes many explicit references to it in the Second Report94 – where, as mentioned earlier, he 




The distinction between primary and secondary rules in the domain of state 
responsibility was the direct result of the critique made to Garcia Amador’s approach, that dealt 
with the topic from the perspective of damages caused to foreigners. Ago played a crucial role 
in applying the distinction to the codification work of the ILC relating to the topic, although it 
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would be too reductionist to underestimate the contribution of other members of the 
Commission. 
It is relevant to note that, despite the fact that, in many ways, the need for the distinction 
was grounded on the separation between political and legal considerations, it would not become 
a reality without the politicization of the discussion within the Commission, mainly due to the 
arguments brought by members from socialist and Third World countries. Their support for the 
Ago’s approach was due more because it offered an exit from the Garcia Amador’s approach 
than because it operated a separation of law from politics.  
Indeed, it seems that the Commission's continuous postponement of any in-depth 
discussion over Garcia Amador's reports and the efforts made to isolate the then Special 
Rapporteur show that an alternative approach to emerge at that time would be the result of a 
robust political compromise.  
Hence, it seems clear that Ago’s appeal, in 1957, to approach state responsibility apart 
from political considerations was grounded on an aporia, since there is hardly a method that is 
not embedded on a political conception over the role of law in relation to politics. A strict legal 
approach to state responsibility made the Commission not to touch upon the causes of the 
influence of colonialism or even capitalism over the topic of state responsibility. Also, by 
splitting form from substance in the topic, the Commission reinforced a view that state 
responsibility has nothing or almost nothing to do with issues politically relevant such as justice, 
fairness, and equality among states.  
If both Garcia Amador and Ago approached the topic politically, despite the efforts of 
the latter to deny it,95 their narratives about the history of the codification of the topic lead to 
similar results.  
Garcia Amador adopted a perspective of continuity regarding the history of codification. 
He envisaged the role of the Commission as one to insist in codifying rules of state 
responsibility regarding damages caused to foreigners. For Ago, such insistence was the very 
cause of the codification efforts of the past to fail. In his view, a break, an evolution was 
necessary to make the codification project to advance: that was by expurgating substantive rules 
from codification.  
 





Such narratives lead to similar results because both looked for the past to find an 
authority to their projects about the codification of state responsibility rules. In the case of 
Garcia Amador, former projects were the path in which the ILC should rely on and, 
consequently, find their authority. For Ago, the failure of past projects was the very cause to 
make the ILC to choose for a different path – in this case, the authority of the work of the ILC 
would rely on the overcoming of the past, being the past a negative force to drive the future.  
This narrative of the road that made the ILC to adopt the distinction between primary 
and secondary rules in the law of state responsibility aimed to show that other possibilities were 
at the table at that time. Having such consciousness is the first step to avoid the future being a 
recurrent repetition of the past or a projection of an unrealised present. This is something that 
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